The Skeptical Internationalist

PAR-What?

2005-10-25T22:46:00.000-04:00

The US raised a few eyebrows at the UN today when it voted against the resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). This is the first time the US, or any other country has voted against the PAROS resolution in its 24 year history. It is unclear if this radical shift in US policy will be setting the diplomatic ground for the US's revised national security space policy or if this is simply the anti-international law rumblings of US Ambassador John Bolton.

Getting yo smack down

2005-10-25T00:00:00.000-04:00

In recent discussions at the UN First Committee, Mexico, Brazil, Kenya, New Zealand and Canada put forth a draft resolution on the initiation of an ad hoc committee on NACD on the margins of the UN First Committee. Or at least that was until came a classic piece of Amb Bolton smack down. In this "diplomatic" note, J-Bolt writes: "We also wish to make clear that the US will NOT (capitals in originals) participate in any international body to which the United States does not agree. Moreover, the United States will not consider itself bound in any way by any agreement emerging from such a body."
Fair enough. No one wants to be constrained by decisions made by others without their consent. For the same reasons, most states dislike being held by American extraterritorial laws that tell them they cannot invest in Cuba or Iran.
But wait. This is an AD HOC committee. Just people talking here. Either way, this diplomatic smackdown was enough to make our Canuck neighbors shiver in their boots and retract their sponsorship of the draft resolution.

UN-Diplomatic

2005-04-09T18:20:00.000-04:00

What gives with the nomination of John Bolton as the US ambassador to the UN? There are many more cost-effective ways to piss off the UN than to hire a full-time diplomat. Just when we were done popping the champagne for his departure from State, here he is coming back to haunt the diplomatic world. And it is hard to figure out why either. Bolton did virtually nothing to deserve this promotion in his time as Assistant Secretary of State for arms control and international security. Bolton derailed the painstakingly achieved verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention with a famous lack of tact and without proposing policy alternatives. So now, instead of a having a moderately useful inspection regime to stop the proliferation of biological weapons, we have nothing at all. At least, Bolton says, we are not complacent with a false sense of security. Great. Despite all of its flaws, the protocol to the BWC would have provided a modicum of confidence and protection against the most ghastly weapons invented by mankind. Under Bolton’s watch, the US also bungled nonproliferation efforts in both Iran and North Korea. By way diplomatic inertia on the part of the US, North Korea is now openly pursuing a nuclear weapons arsenal. Bolton’s harsh rhetoric has only served to further poison relations between the DPRK and the US, without doing a fig in getting North Korea back into the NPT. It may be funny to say "I don't do carrots" but at the end of the day, we now got a nuclear-armed country that considers the US a mortal enemy. The same can be said about Iran, which looks closer than ever to acquiring a nuclear arsenal. Bolton’s shop at State showed a consistent lack of initiative and imagination to address the toughest cases of proliferation. Where Bolton did show a great degree of imagination was by declaring that Libya, Iraq, and Cuba among others had active biological weapons programs. In the last four years, these claims have proven to be patently false, embarrassing State Department, compromising the credibility of the US, and plunging the nation into a costly and unnecessary war in Iraq. More recently claims have been made public that Bolton tried to get a CIA officer fired for not agreeing with his assessment regarding Cuba’s purported biological weapons program. What about Bolton’s Proliferation Security Initiative? Did the PSI not help to unravel the Libyan nuclear program and AQ Khan’s nuclear network? Bolton’s attempt to take credit for this success is laughable. Libya’s disarmament was not the result of the interception of the BBC China vessel. Libya disarmed after long diplomatic negotiations initiated under the Clinton Administration. Only once Libya made the political decision to disarm was the BBC China intercepted. And it was not intercepted due to the PSI. Human intelligence sources from the CIA in Malaysia and apparently cooperation from inside Libya’s secret service itself are what led to the singling of the BBC China for interception. The vessel was intercepted in the Italian port of Taranto. Since the vessel was in the territorial waters of Italy, there was no need for the PSI to justify searching the vessel. Every sovereign nation has the right to search vessels while they are in their ports. Therefore the PSI had nothing to do with success in Libya or Pakistan. Even in theory, the PSI will likely be ineffective. As an unnamed military search officer recently said, it is virtually impossible to find a WMD-related widget in a football field-sized container ship. And that is assuming that you know there is a widget in any given container ship in the first place. As Wade Boese of the Arms Control Association recently pointed out, Bolton’s ideological aversion to any form of international law has also become a liability for the US. Bolton seems more interested in keeping the US free from treaty obligation than from the threats of WMD. Oh, and did I mention his close personal ties with the government of Taiwan? Now that conflict of interest should go over well when Bolton addresses China in the Security Council…

To sum up:

Number of false WMD accusations made by Bolton that have damaged US credibility: 3

Number of countries that are likely to have gone nuclear under Bolton’s watch: 2

Number of conflicts of interest Bolton has with foreign states: 1

It’s time to pull the plug on this charade.

To hear a counter point see William Kristol's piece in the Weekly Standard. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/470mdmkj.asp .

2005-03-08T00:40:00.000-05:00

Shit Don't Work

Slow Motion Proliferation

2005-01-25T22:36:00.000-05:00

Watching events unfold in Iran has been as agonizing as the paralysis of the world community in dealing with the issue. Proliferation is occurring in slow-motion in front of our very eyes. Thanks to crafty Iranian strategic planning, UN reticence, and self-defeating American foreign policy, the world community has been incapable in dealing in one of the most flagrant cases of proliferation in recent memory. This essay looks at what options are available for dealing with Iran, namely coercion, diplomacy, or apathy.
Iran’s behavior no longer leaves much doubt regarding its intentions. It makes no sense for a country flush with oil and gas to engage in brinksmanship for any purported benefit of nuclear power. More precisely, there have been a string of most worrying developments:

-The illicit trade with Pakistan in advanced maraging steel P2 uranium centrifuges and Chinese nuclear blueprints
-Suspicious experiments with polonium, a substance with little civil uses, but which serves fairly well for triggering a nuclear device,
-The construction of a heavy water plant in Arak which seems odd since Iran is building a light water reactor but can be used to extract plutonium
-The undeclared construction of a enrichment plant in Natanz
-Advanced experimental work with laser enrichment,
-The presence of nuclear material at the Parchin army base and the Doshen-Tappen air force base
-Delays deliberately caused by Iranian scientists of the inspection of certain nuclear sites
-The beginning of (uneconomical) uranium mining in western Yadz province
-Undeclared stock of uranium tetrafluoride (yellow cake) from China potentially used in the feed of uranium centrifuges
-Undeclared or inconsistent accounting of uranium enrichment experiments
-The adamant rejection of any freeze on uranium enrichment despite guarantees offered by Russia for the supply of nuclear fuel

All these points, while providing only very strong circumstantial evidence, describe a worrying trend in Iran. Since the serious allegations by Iranian resistance movements started to surface about Iran’s nuclear program in 2002, there has been increasing talk of military strikes. Tough talk towards Iran, already a staple of American politics has been steadily on the rise. President Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney have already made it clear that all options are on the table (which sounds suspiciously familiar to discussion before the Iraq War). We are now faced with the unpalatable options of a nuclear Iran or a Israeli/American strike on Iranian facilities. What to do?

There are generally three policy options on this issue. First, states can pursue a diplomatic channels to convince Iran that acquiring nuclear weapons is not in its best interest and by dangling the carrot of economic and technological investment. Second, states can threaten Iran with military coercion or economic sanctions if it does not cease its nuclear program. In either case, states are trying to alter Iranian strategic calculus by weighing in on the potential costs of an Iranian nuclear program, and the benefits of unilateral dismantlement. The third option is to take a laissez-fair stance and to let Iran pursue its nuclear program unhibited.
At the moment, the EU troika composed of France, the UK, and Germany has tried the diplomatic option with only moderate success. Whereas Europe wants a permanent accord, Iran prefers a temporary freezing of its enrichment program. Iran calculates that such flexibility will suit it best. Indeed, while the economic investment may evaporate as soon as it rekindles its uranium enrichment program, the technology transfers promised by the EU are irreversible. Therefore it is highly possible that an aborted EU deal could only make things worse. The Troika is aware of this and therefore, is particularly reluctant to ink any deal that is not permanent. The Europeans hope that once parched and embargoed Iran tastes the sweet nectar of foreign investment, it will quickly realize that it is in its best interest to continue its restraint. However such optimism is ill advised for three principle reasons. First, the theocracy that rules Iran with renewed fervor since highjacking the last parliamentary elections in 2004, sees trade and foreign penetration as a threat to its grip on power. Already it has tried to crack down on satellite television and diverse cultural products from the West. The Mullahs understand full well that a burgeoning middle class will only restore the democratic undercurrents already present in Iranian society. Second, the governing regime in Iran has very successfully framed the issue of its nuclear program as one of national pride, modernization, and self-determination. With their rich history and a traditional role as a regional power, many Iranians feel that their country should not be told what to do, particularly by a cabal of hypocritical Western nuclear states. They see nonproliferation efforts as a mask for the subjugation of a modern Iran. In fact the vast majority of Iranian favor a nuclear program. Talk of acquiring nuclear weapons has become ever more mainstream. The genius of the Iranian regime has been to stoke the fires of nationalism so that it can come to the negotiating table with the EU and say: “look, we would like to freeze our program but popular opinion against it is too strong; our hands our tied.” Third, even if the EU managed to steer Iran away from its current nuclear course, Iran would still possess the knowledge and indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons at a later time. These thorny questions will continue to bedevil European efforts to negotiate any sustainable accord with Iran.

In the meantime, it is likely that Iran will continue to push the limits of its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, playing a careful game of brinksmanship by alternatively cooperating with the European and incrementally advancing its nuclear program until it reaches a nuclear weapons threshold. The tense negotiations with both the EU and the IAEA are designed to buy time and avoid at all costs referral to the UN Security Council. Eventually, what Iran is probably aiming for is not overt nuclear capability since this would only invite more economic sanctions and possibly a preventative war, but instead what I call “opaque deterrence.” Under opaque deterrence Iran will benefit from nuclear deterrence by combining the frightful power of nuclear weapons with the uncertainty of Iran’s nuclear status. Because states will function on worst-case scenarios, the opaque deterrent will function in the absence of any demonstrated capability. Yet because Iran will exercise a modicum of restraint, Iran will avoid pariah status. By failing to discover any direct evidence of a nuclear weapons program, while at the same time unearthing strong circumstantial proof of such a program, the IAEA helps bolster Iranian opaque deterrence. Maintaining opaque deterrence will be made ever easier in the wake of the Iraq war, since states will be less predisposed to entertaining circumstantial evidence as proof a dedicated nuclear weapons program.

If diplomacy were fraught with difficulty, would the military option be a viable alternative? At some level, it would seem simpler to bypass stalled diplomacy and endless UN inspections and conduct surgical strike against designated Iranian facilities. Indeed, the Israeli strike on the Osirak reactor in 1981 set back Iraq’s nuclear program half a decade (incidentally one of the pilots who carried out the attacks was later an astronaut who died in the 2003 Columbia shuttle tragedy- you can only imagine the commentary in the Arab world about divine retribution). Inspections by the IAEA, intelligence collected by Israel’s Mossad and American agencies in addition to penetration and defection by Iranian resistance groups have helped identify the major Iranian facilities. Sure, Iran may have several smaller labs stowed away over its vast territory, but a surgical strike will only seek to cripple Iran’s program, not uproot it completely. Because their objectives are limited, a strike by the US or Israel would not require a potentially bloody occupation as the one being undertaken in Iraq. However, the strike could be enough to destabilize the regime, giving rise to a popular revolution. Finally the timing of the strike would be optimal since the break-up of one of Iran’s most precious nuclear suppliers: the network of AQ Khan. This would make it more difficult for Iran to reconstitute its nuclear program.

While it is clear that a surgical strike on Iran could be carried out with some success, and yield some short term benefits, such a policy option would be strategically disastrous over the longer term. First, while it is unlikely that Iran would launch a future punitive ballistic missile attack on Israel or the US (it will be deterred in the first case, and unable in the second), it could wreck havoc in the US and Israeli regional interests. For example, Iran has strong leverage in Iraq, particularly among the Shiite community. It could therefore incite violence in Iraq, at a time where the US is trying to impose a level of stability. The same goes to a certain extent in Afghanistan, where Iran could seek to fund rebel groups to pester Western forces in the country. Indeed, it takes a very little investment on Iran’s part to demolish the American efforts in the Middle East over the last four years. For Israel, an attack on Iranian facilities would be an invitation to further sponsoring Hamas and derailing the fragile goodwill between the Palestinian Authority and the state of Israel. For both the US and Israel, such a strike could only promote the cause of the Jihadists who, although principally Arab, not Persian, already see a worldwide American-Zionist conspiracy against Muslims. Such sentiments will be multiplied in the case of any collateral damage resulting from such attacks. While many Iranian facilities are situated in remote locations, the Iran has purposely set up certain key facilities in urban areas. Therefore, even if the US were able to conduct precision strike on nuclear facilities, there remains the distinct possibility that an attack could spread radioactive material in the vicinity. A coercive strategy is unlikely to succeed over the longer term because, unlike other proliferators such as Libya who have sought to import a nuclear capability lock, stock, and barrel, Iran has actually cultivated indigenous capacities. That means that although the facilities can be destroyed, the knowledge remains in the heads of the scientists. It is not unlikely that after a strike, Iran would pull out of the NPT and pursue its program underground away from inspectors and this time with a grudge. Lastly a strike is likely to entrench the power of the hardliners in Iran. Iranians are a fiercely nationalist people. They may resent the theocracy of the Mullahs, but they also resent foreign domination. A strike on Iran could be just what the Khomeini’i government needs to get the population to rally around the flag.

Faced with the equally unpalatable options of diplomacy and coercion, would it not be so bad to let Iran go nuclear? After all, every nuclear proliferator (except the US) has shown sober restraint in the stewardship of these weapons. India and Pakistan, like the US and the Soviet Union before them, have “learned” to live with the bomb. Why should we expect things to be any different in Iran? While Iran may declare its intention to erase Israel from the map, a position made for domestic consumption more than anything else, would it really be willing to invite retaliation under such foolish pretenses and after such a long scientific venture? Is it not the least understandable that Iran would seek some form of security after its declared nemesis violently overthrew two of its neighbors in two years and opened denounced it a member of an axis of evil? In fact would it not be possible, as famed international relations scholar Kenneth Waltz posited, that relations between Iran and its neighbors could be pacified by nuclear deterrence?

While it is certainly possible that an Iranian arsenal will not be as catastrophic as one would first be lead to believe, a case of Iranian proliferation right in front of the eyes of the IAEA would undoubtedly have a deleterious effect on the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a whole. It would show that IAEA safeguards, even the more stringent safeguards implemented under the additional protocol, are unable to halt nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, the right to nuclear power enshrined under the NPT could in fact be seen as an unacceptable liability. Yet, disallow this right would undermine the very bargain that underpins the treaty and its apartheid between nuclear and non-nuclear states. All these issues will undoubtedly surface at the NPT review conference scheduled this spring. There are also several documented risks associated with budding nuclear arsenal in the developing world. Developing states may not be capable or able to afford robust technical measures to prevent the unlawful use of nuclear devices. Also, a state with few weapons is likely to use hair-trigger launching procedures, since it will be acutely concerns of having its command and control decapitated before being able to retaliate. Bureaucratic politics and standard operating procedures can also create instability by infusing a degree of both incoherence and rigidity in the state’s response. Ultimately there is bound to be some degree of concern with regards to the political control of the weapons, given the fragile base of the current regime. It would be bad enough to recreate the chaos of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, let alone with nuclear weapons thrown into the mix. Lastly, it should not hoped that Iran will eventually come to view nuclear weapons as obsolete and unusable, as did Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, and Ukraine. Unlike South Korea, Iran does not have any nuclear allies. Unlike Belarus, Kazakhstan, Libya, and Ukraine, Iran has an indigenous nuclear capacity of which it is extremely proud. Unlike South Africa, this indigenous capacity was not the scheme of some minority. Unlike Argentina and Brazil, Iran does not live in a relatively peaceful area of the world. The Middle East remains extremely dangerous for Iran, despite the fall of two of its rivals in Iraq and Afghanistan. It still has poor relations with the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. The US still has almost 200,000 troops in the region.

The IAEA remains an invaluable resource because it is both highly capable and largely seen as objective. A third term for its director general, Mohammed El-Baradei, will only strengthen its mandate. Yet, the policy impasse in Iran highlights the IAEA needs to seriously reform it operations. First, the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) must make it a matter of course to refer all violations of safeguards to the Security Council. It must cease to try to bargain and haggle with countries at the BoG, because this will politicize its decision to refer any case to the SC later on. Indeed, sensing this politicization, Iran threatened numerous times to pull out of the NPT if it was referred to the SC. The IAEA must stay out of the fray. Besides the SC is equipped with a wider range of sanctions to deal with a contravening state in a more timely fashion, if and when circumstances demand action. Second, the IAEA should seriously consider suggestions made by the UK to freeze all IAEA member privileges when such members are under investigation. It makes no sense to give Iran full access to nuclear technology when strong and repeated circumstantial evidence appears that it is violating its safeguards agreements. Iran has made much headway in its nuclear program in the years it was most closely being investigated by the IAEA. By not freezing its privileges completely, the IAEA only gave Iran incentives to pursue endless stalling tactics to buy time. Third, the IAEA and the world community must do more to push the additional protocol for more stringent inspections. It is likely that Iran would have been caught earlier on if additional safeguards had been in place before 2003.

Changes

2004-12-30T21:29:00.000-05:00

As you may have noticed, the format of the Skeptical Internationalist has changed slighty and has a less personal touch. This decision was undertaken to ensure the same high quality ranting on international issues you've come to expect from the SkepInt without compromising the job security of the editor.

2004-12-25T18:46:00.000-05:00

Maine

Putting Things in Perspective

2004-12-13T23:46:00.000-05:00

From Harpers’s Index:
-Number of U.S. soldiers returned from Iraq in the last year who have been diagnosed with mental-health problems : 5,375
-Ratio of suicides worldwide in 2001 to war deaths : 7:2
-Ratio of Americans killed by lightning since January 2002 to those killed by terrorism : 3:2
-Estimated number of Afghans who died in last year’s pistachio harvest : 50
-Number of restaurants in Guizhou, China, closed in April for adding opium to their dishes : 215

2004-11-09T18:35:00.000-05:00

Gotta Love Viennese Humor

To Be Or Not To BMD?

2004-10-25T17:14:00.000-04:00

The question of participation in North American ballistic missile defense (BMD) has become one of the hottest items in Canadian foreign policy. It has also proven to be surprisingly divisive. During the spring 2004 federal elections, Conservatives promised to bring Canada into BMD, NDP Socialists came out staunchly against it, and Liberals cleverly sidestepped the issue by stating that they opposed the militarization of outer space. Even the Bloc, whose sole wish remains to extricate Quebec from Canada, figured Canada should reject BMD. The debate rages further within the Canadian government with the Department of National Defense (DND) opting for BMD, and Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) generally advising against it. Canada’s population is also split on the question, with slim majority (48%) of Canadians in favor and 44% against. British Columbia and Quebec remained most opposed to BMD (53% and 50% opposed respectively) and the Prairies and the Maritimes more in favor. (for stats see Ottawa Citizen of October 5th 2004). Faced with such a divisive issue, what policy should Canada pursue? The bad news is that there is no clear answer to this complex question. The good news is that the outcome of a decision on BMD will not be devastating to international security and bilateral relations. Furthermore it is also an issue with a range of policy options that is amenable to being finely tailored to Canadian interests. This essay will tackle the question in two parts. First, the political and financial costs of the proposed missile shield will be outlined with a particular emphasis on arms racing and diplomacy. Second, the advantages of such a shield will be explained and the concerns of the anti-BMD party addressed. It will be concluded that Canada has an interest a limited participation in BMD, without nonetheless embarking wholeheartedly in the venture.

Cons

Opponents of BMD make four main points regarding the costs of missile defense and its strategic, diplomatic, and environmental consequences. First, missile defense is prohibitively expensive. At a bare minimum, missile defense requires a network several high-powered radar sites (some on floating platforms in the ocean), a constellation of early warning satellites, strategically located silos, and missile interceptors. Such bases must be staffed by specially trained personnel, be well maintained and kept on high alert. The U.S. missile defense agency has already spent $130 billion on BMD. Despite these expenses, the missile defense system being put into place is not even properly functional. The Bush Administration has rushed the establishment BMD without being assured that the system actually works, motivated by a combination of ill-advised campaign promises, post-9/11 fear, and departmental budgetary infighting. Instead of proving the science and engineering behind BMD and then building such a system, the American Department of Defense (DoD) has been operating on the euphemistically named evolutionary acquisition. This means that the DoD has decided to build first and think later about the functioning of the system. The track record so far is less than encouraging. Few of the already little tests be categorized as a success, and only because the exercises was highly scripted, with the DoD knowing precisely the origin, time, and type of missile to be intercepted. Such tests are not realistic, and it would be wishful thinking that America would become any safer because of them. If anything, such a spatial “Maginot line” will endow the U.S. with a false sense of security. Physicists such as Ted Postol at MIT have long argued that the technology is immature and it is foolish to devote our capital and energies to these projects at this time. Furthermore there is a real opportunity cost for Canadian taxpayers attached to BMD. Every dollar spent on an immature missile defense is a dollar that is not spent on badly needed hospital beds, daycare for single mothers, and military equipment for our own pitifully underfunded military.
Second, BMD may have cause diplomatic damage. Canadian foreign policy has long rested on its reputation of being pragmatically idealist, an honest broker, and a leader on initiatives such as peacekeeping, human security, and anti-personnel landmines disarmament. Canada leverages a disproportionate amount of so-called ‘soft power’ because countries trust its intentions, admire its vision of a more peaceful world, and believe it is a country that keeps its word on international law. If Canada were seen to be embarking on a BMD project that may violate international space law, bilateral treaties against missile defense, and the spirit of arms control, it may find it more difficult to push its progressive agenda on a range of issues from human rights to nonproliferation in the future. Since its foundation, Canada has nurtured a reputation that garnishes it respect, confidence, and leverage in international affairs. While Canada should not feel needlessly bridled by world opinion, it must weight its effects in the context of a possibly expensive, inefficient, and unnecessary BMD system.
Third, ballistic missile defense will have adverse strategic effects. No country can be completely safe if other major players in the international system feel insecure. It is this logic that underpinned the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, which maintained stability during the Cold War. Thus, the U.S. cannot make itself invulnerable without generating a whole range of countermeasures by peer competitors such as Russia, China, Pakistan, India, and North Korea among others. These countermeasures can go from the basic, such as simply smuggling in WMD into the U.S. through cargo ships or attaching decoys to missiles, to the complex, such as building ballistic missile that follow erratic and unpredictable paths, such as the “Crazy Ivan” currently being developed by Russia, or by investing in blue sea submarines that can launch missiles closer to the shores of the U.S. where they will be difficult to intercept. Most likely, the result of a BMD will be a renewed arms race. States that were previously content with a minimal deterrent force will produce more ballistic missiles with multiple warheads in order to overwhelm the missile shield. Tragically by trying to become secure, the U.S. will find itself in the long term in a similar state of vulnerability, only this time with more weapons pointed at it. The U.S. could always upgrade its missile defense system. However, it must be cognizant that it will constantly be at a disadvantage so long as that the cost of intercepting an extra missile is greater than the cost of building an extra missile. Thus Canada may be unwillingly promoting an arms race by giving political and military backing to North American BMD. BMD may also produce an arms race in outer space that goes against Canadian policy and interests. So far, the U.S. has been talking about a ground-based BMD involving interceptors based on Earth. However, it is not unlikely that the U.S. will go ahead with a second phase of space-based BMD similar to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI dubbed as “Star Wars”) proposed by President Reagan in the 1980s. Indeed, DoD has recently approved a project for a space-based interceptor test bed by 2012. While a space-based interceptor is likely to improve the effectiveness of BMD, it has two drawbacks. First, if such a BMD involved weapons of mass destruction, it could violate the Outer Space Treaty, as well as seriously anger states such as China and Russia who vehemently oppose the weaponisation of outer space. In the future, if such countries come to view satellites as offensive weapons, they will seek to develop anti-satellite devices (ASATs) to negate them, thus opening the previously untouched sanctuary of outer space to the ravages of war. The use of ASATs could also lead to the creation of millions of pieces of space debris. Such debris, which in the space environment travels at 10 km per second could eventually cripple the satellite network modern society has come to depend on, or render outer space increasingly inaccessible. Because of these concerns, Canada has consistently opposed the weaponisation of outer space. However, if Canada refuses to join on the second phase of BMD, it is likely to face an even more serious rebuke from the U.S. than it does today, since the U.S. would have at that point sunken considerable capital in a BMD infrastructure. Therefore the cost of saying no to the second phase of BMD will eliminate the political favor Canada could accumulate from the U.S. by joining the first phase of BMD. Canada needs to closely evaluate this prospect in its continuing mission to improve bilateral relations with the U.S.
Lastly, Canada must examine the environmental impact of BMD. The first issue involves the stationing of radar and interceptor bases on Canadian soil. Because it is likely that such bases would be placed in the Arctic or the West Coast, both areas with potentially fragile ecosystems, Ottawa will need to carefully evaluate its responsibilities as custodian of Canada’s natural resources. Furthermore, BMD bases stationed on Canadian soil could become target of any preemptive strike. In this sense, BMD will make Canada a greater target. The second environmental issue revolves around the question of missile debris. Because ballistic missile en route to the U.S. tend to arc over the far north, it is likely that a missile intercept would occur just above Canadian airspace. This means that debris, including WMD warheads, from intercepted missiles could come falling down on Canada, posing an environmental and safety threat. The third environmental issue, briefly touched upon previously, is the question of orbital debris caused by an intercept in outer space. Such orbital debris could wreck havoc on satellites and jeopardize mankind’s access to outer space. With all these concerns in mind, it is understandable that many Canadians are weary or opposed to BMD. Most Canadians don’t find the prospect of a North Korea missile crashing down on Vancouver, Toronto, or Montreal credible. Nor do they feel it is worth draining the nation’s coffers and bruising its international reputation in order to avert such a remote threat.

Pros

Missile defense advocates point out that while some of the concerns of those who oppose BMD may be valid, overall a missile shield would serve Canada’s interests. First, there are many misconceptions about the scope and intentions of missile defense. The BMD system being put in place is designed to protect North America from a fairly limited number of ballistic missiles. The reasons for such a limited system are not just related to technological hurdles. A limited system would be prudent since it could protect against an accidental launch of a few missiles by Russia or China or by extremist elements within those regimes. Given the state of the former Soviet arsenal, and the degree of corruption in both countries, such concerns cannot be dismissed lightly. A limited system could also protect against rogue state that fail to grasp the logic of deterrence. The prime example of this is North Korea, which in 1998 conducted a missile test over Japan and has recently admitted developing nuclear weapons. Although the U.S. and Canada could easily retaliate to such an attack, Reagan aptly pointed out: “would it not be better to protect lives than to avenge them?” A limited system could also mitigate the negative strategic implications of BMD. Countries like China or Russia who has armories of 100 and 10,000? Intercontinental ballistic missile respectively would have little incentive to build more weapons to penetrate a system designed to intercept only 20 missiles at a time. Thus it is possible to maintain the stabilizing effects of MAD while protecting against accidents or irrational leaders. This is why in spite of the shrill warnings of a 21st century arms race, we have seen relatively little reaction from China or Russia. Part of the reason for this lies, in what Stephen Van Evera calls the offense-defense balance. So long as defensive technology is predominant, international relations remain more stable since states do not fear a devastating first strike. Thus states are more willing to engage patiently in diplomacy and negotiations, and are less likely to be bedeviled by suspicions and misperceptions. In the case of BMD, ballistic missile can be considered (albeit counter-intuitively) defensive weapons since they are generally retaliatory weapons that cannot in and of themselves conquer territory. So long as ballistic missiles are cheaper and easier to produce than BMD systems, the offense-defense balance, and consequently stability, is maintained. While BMD cannot be the panacea to all forms of WMD attacks on the mainland from smuggling to submarine-launched weapons, it does not follow that it should not be undertaken at all. It can only be one brick in North America’s defensive wall.
It is interesting to note the contradictions in the anti BMD crowd’s rhetoric. One the one hand they note that such a BMD defense will not work because the technology primitive for the challenge of intercepting missiles. On the other hand they state that such a defense system will, trying to make America invulnerable, spur an arms race. The contradiction is deeper among those peace activists that worry about a nuclear Armageddon, yet at the same time are opposed to steps to help avert nuclear attacks.
While Canada may not believe it is a target of an eventual attack, it will be affected directly and indirectly by an attack on the U.S. Canada will be affected directly if a WMD warhead lands in a city close to the border. Such an attack could produce fallout that could reach Canada, especially in border twin cities such as Seattle/Vancouver, Buffalo Toronto, or Detroit/Windsor. Canada could be affected indirectly because of its economic dependence on the U.S. A ballistic missile attack on the U.S. would have a devastating impact on its economy, much like the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Because some 85% of Canada’s trade is with the U.S., a hitch in the American economy should have a strong ripple effect in Canada. For better or for worse, Canada’s security cannot be disentangled from that of the U.S. It is also likely that regardless of Canada’s participation or consent, the U.S. would use Canada’s airspace to shoot down incoming missile that threatens the lives of thousands of its citizens. Another indirect effect will be felt on bilateral relations with the U.S. If Canada chooses to opt out of BMD, it will be left out of the American politico-military decision-making processes, such as North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD). Without a seat at the table, Canada will find it ever more difficult to influence American policy. Because much of Canada’s clout in the world derives from its special relationship with the U.S., opting out of missile defense will also decrease Canada’s global influence.
Opponents of BMD often describe it as the “son of Star Wars”: Reagan’s ill-fated missile defense system in the 1980s. They also claim that BMD will lead to the weaponisation of space. Such comments are disingenuous because they mischaracterize the nature of BMD and the weaponisation of space. The SDI program proposed by Reagan foresaw a constellation of satellites with laser capabilities designed to shoot down missiles. In contrast, the BMD plan being implemented is earth-based. While surveillance and early warning capabilities are in part space-based (with much of the same technology used for meteorology and mapping), all the weapons are non-spaced based. This means that BMD does not in and of itself weaponize space. What it does do however is contribute to the militarization of space, which is a distinct, and not altogether negative, thing. Think for example of satellite guided precision munitions that help avoid civilian casualties during bombing campaigns, or satellite mapping devices that help verify disarmament treaties and track down terrorists. Military uses of outer space are not inherent bad, it is the weaponization of outer space that constitutes a threat to the secure and sustainable use of outer space for the greater benefit of mankind. If anything it is the ballistic missiles themselves that already constitute a weaponisation of outer space since their trajectories inherently involves a transit through low earth orbit. Therefore claiming that BMD will contribute to weaponisation of space is deceptive. Lastly, Canada will be breaching no international law by engaging in BMD. The Outer Space Treaty only bans the placement of WMD in space, and the Moscow Treaty against BMD has already been annulled by the U.S. (in any case it was a bilateral treaty between the U.S. and the USSR/Russia that was not signed by Canada).

Conclusion

At the end of the day, there are compelling arguments for and against BMD. As with all low probability-high impact threats, the issue generates a high degree of both skepticism and panic. The first thing Canada should do is wait. Ottawa should wait to see the outcome of the November 2nd U.S. presidential elections. John Kerry has not come down strongly for or against BMD. Even his more hawkish comments about defending America should be viewed through the prism of election-year rhetoric. The result of the election and/or a shift in U.S. policy may settle the issue for Canada since it will not be considering building BMD on its own. Furthermore the question is not all that pressing. The U.S. DoD has made it known that it will not rush Canada and will be continuing with its plans regardless of Canada’s decision. If the U.S. decides to go ahead with BMD, Canada has an interest in a limited form of participation that helps it address the possible threat of a ballistic missiles and the need for warmer bilateral relations, while minimizing financial burdens and strategic/diplomatic fracas. Second, if Canada decides to join BMD it must make it clear that it will only contribute territory for bases and over-flight rights. It should not contribute resources to the research and development of an expensive and uncertain BMD system, nor should it pay for the bases, launchers, or early warning systems. Canada must make it clear that it is it that is doing a favor for the U.S. A favor that can hold benefits for it, but political and strategic liabilities as well. Third, Canada must make it perfectly clear from the beginning that it will not participate in any second phase of BMD that can involve the placement of weapons in space. Fourth, Canada should embark with China, Russia and a host of non-aligned countries on a campaign to ban the weaponisation of outer space. This will create a legal and normative firewall to the creeping weaponisation of outer space, and uphold Canada’s reputation in the eyes of the world community.

Crude Rhetoric

2004-09-12T13:46:00.000-04:00

I find it amazing that in a time of soaring gas prices that I still am arguing over whether the 2003 Iraq War was fought over oil. It’s time to set the record straight about the purported role of oil in world politics. The reasons for this are more than academic. The “blood for oil” mantra is not only logically dubious but also distract us from the real need to reform American foreign policy and intelligence gathering. As long as we continue believing that the war was fought solely or even principally out of greed, we will be unable to address these problems. This essay will have three parts. First, the blood for oil thesis will be expounded. Second, the thesis’ incongruence with the facts will be displayed. Third, and more philosophically the internal contradictions of this line of argumentation will be pointed out. Fourth, this rhetoric’s corrosive effect on policy making will be explained.
The blood for oil thesis is particularly attractive to those on the far left because it bundles three of their favorite bêtes noires namely: war, capitalism, and pollution. Collectively these evils amount to what some like to term imperialism (this is actually an etymologically abusive use of the term but I will go no further on the subject for now). The reasoning is relatively straightforward. The health of the U.S. economy depends on the reliable supply of cheap oil. While the U.S. is one of the world’s ten largest producers of oil, it still needs to import 58% of its oil. It may come as a surprise to many to know that the number one supplier of this imported oil is Canada, which pumps 1.708 million barrels a day to the U.S., three times more than the quantity that came from Iraq before the war. However, proven reserves at home and in Canada are finite. Because the welfare of the nation has come to depend so heavily on oil, successive Democratic and Republican administrations have seen its ready supply as an issue of strategic concern. Indeed the Carter Doctrine, first expounded in 1980, explicitly stated that no one state should control the access and traffic to the Persian Gulf. The strategic importance of oil also explains the U.S.’s uncomfortably close relationship with Saudi Arabia, whose human rights record and militant religiosity are otherwise antithetical to American interests and values. Because America seeks to gain more leverage on the Kingdom of Saud regarding its support of radical Islam and terrorism (remember that 15 of the 19 September 11th hijackers were Saudis), it needs to relieve its dependence on Saudi oil. This is where Iraq comes in. Iraq sits atop 11% of the world’s proven oil reserves, the second largest concentration after Saudi Arabia. If the U.S. could secure access to Iraq’s oil, it could more effectively combat terrorism without jeopardizing its oil supply. Ready supply means low fuel prices, which means lots of happy SUV-driving, soccer-mom voters. What this also means, according to the blood-for-oil thesis, is profits for greedy Republicans. Because the White House is so closely tied with the oil industry, the American executive has personal reasons to see rising oil supply. Indeed President Bush used to work in the oil industry, Vice-President Cheney used to run Texas-based Halliburton and national security advisor Condoleezza Rice sits on the Board of Chevron and even has an oil tanker named after her. Those who support the blood-for-oil thesis are very suspicious of the official arguments for the War. If WMD is a concern, why are we not invading North Korea, which has kicked out UN inspectors, abrogated its commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, openly declared its intention to develop a nuclear deterrent? Looking at both cases, the blood-for-oil crowd notes the variable that North Korea does not have is oil (indeed it is highly dependent on China in this regard). They conclude that the different outcome must be a result of oil, revealing in broad daylight the true purpose of the war. Arguing that the war was fought mainly for oil provides a simple Manichaeistic view of international relations that fits neatly with preconceived ideology. All nuance is dispelled in favor of compartmentalized good and evil.
While this is an appealing argument to explain imperialist state behavior, it fails to hold up to close scrutiny. The first fallacy is that the Iraq War was that it was profitable. In fact, the Iraq War has been predictably expensive directly through the costs of military operations, and indirectly through its effect on the markets. Of course what is rarely examined is the opportunity cost of the Iraq War, namely how else taxpayer money could have been spent (for a fascinating view of this see: http://costofwar.com/). U.S. military operations alone cost $143 billion, reconstruction so far has cost $19 billion with more than $50 billion projected in the future. These are the direct costs, which already outweigh the benefits of extra oil production. Even a two-term Bush presidency would be long over before Iraq's broken economy realized its full capacity of 6 million barrels per day.
The indirect costs of the war can be seen in the fluctuation of oil prices and economic uncertainty. The simple threat of war added a $6 to $10 insurance premium to the price of an oil barrel. Multiply this by 19.761 million barrels, the daily oil consumption of the U.S. in a single day in 2002 and you quickly get an idea of the cost of instability (for a graphic analysis in the fluctuation of oil prices see: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/chron.html). In the lead up to the War, there were serious concerns that the oil fields of Iraq would be damaged as the ones in Kuwait had been in 1991. This would have only jacked the price of oil even further. At this point many blood-for-oil proponents change their argument and say: “aha! You see the oilmen started a war to drive up the prices of oil so that they could reap more profits.” This is a very different argument from the previous one (in fact the opposite) that claimed that the U.S. started a war to get cheap oil, but it is equally deceptive. A rapid increase in the price of oil could easily cause a recession both in the U.S. and the world, causing a decrease in economic activity, decreased demand for oil, decreased prices, and consequently decreased returns for American oil companies. Indeed, in the period leading up to the Iraq War, we see a slowing down of GDP growth in the U.S. during the fourth quarter of 2002 and the first quarter of 2003, reflecting uncertainty in future energy costs (see http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/newsrel/gdp_glance.htm). Even if the invasion had carried on without a hitch, a rise in the production of oil would not necessarily be in the best interest of the oil lobby. A flooding of the market could cause oil prices to decrease along with profits for oil firms. Furthermore plummeting oil prices would kill off the less competitive domestic American oil producers. Thus we see that fixing oil prices through military action is not as straightforward as the blood-for-oil crowd would like us to believe. After all, if the American oil lobby wanted to see a fall in the price of oil without the risky political fallout of an invasion, it would have been easier to lift the sanctions slapped on Iraq after the Gulf War and/or attempt a rapprochement with Iran (in which case the left would accuse the U.S. of making another pact with the devil to satiate its oil addiction). Indeed when Iraq was permitted to export oil again under the UN’s oil-for-food program in 1995, the worldwide price of oil decreased accordingly.
Another major problem with the blood for oil thesis is that it misreads the international energy market. In 2002, just as the diplomatic storm was gathering over a war in Iraq, Canada was publicizing the discovery of oil sands in Alberta that could represent some 174.4 billion barrels (up till then Canada’s proven reserves stood at 4.5 billion barrels). This would give Canada the second largest proven oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia. It would be hard to explain then why America would launching a war literally at the other end of the planet, stoking the flames of religious militants, precisely at a time when huge oil deposits were being discovered on the grounds of its largest and most reliable trading partner, neighbor, and ally.
The real problem with the blood-for-oil thesis is that it is politically unfeasible. The possible long-term economic benefits are out of synch with American political cycles and therefore could not have a substantial electoral impact. A potential war could have cost the Republicans the White House if it went badly. Because there is a lot of uncertainty involved in war and because the election is so hotly contested, a war for oil could be politically suicidal. Furthermore, there was widespread agreement in the lead up to the invasion that years of investment in Iraq’s infrastructure would be necessary before the oilfields would begin to generate returns. The majority of the costs of the war were foreseeable. The risks were generally known. Even if we were to accept for a second that the Bush administration was run by crooks, we would have to recognize that these crooks were taking extraordinary risk for uncertain and long term benefits. We would also need to explain why this Administration has repeatedly and publicly committed itself to handing over the control of oil to the new government of Iraq, and why a majority of Congress voted to give the President the authority to go to war with Iraq, despite their lack of ties with the oil industry.
From a philosophical point of view, the main flaw of the blood-for-oil thesis is that it is unfalsifiable. While this may intuitively seem like an asset, it actually discredits the argument because statements that cannot be proven to be false in principle are scientifically unsound. This is a basic tenet of the philosophy of science that was pioneered by Karl Popper in 1950s. In his treaties on scientific method, he argued that Marxism and Freudian psychology were pseudo-scientific for this reason. Marxism argued that either the workers would rebel against the bourgeois. If they failed to exhibit any signs of resistance Marx stated that it was due to false consciousness caused by bourgeois brainwashing. The same goes for the blood-for-oil thesis. Whether the U.S. goes to war, applies sanctions or contrarily protects and aides a country, it is all due to oil interest. If an ‘imperial’ war causes oil prices to spike, it is because the powers that be want to reap highly profits. If on the contrary, oil prices drop it is because gluttonous America wants cheap oil. Oil becomes the Rosetta Stone of international relations. It explains everything. It even gives contradictory explanations for the same event. This is why I have become skeptical of the blood-for-oil thesis. Anti-war demonstrators have deployed the same arguments for virtually every war of the last 15 years. The Kosovo campaign was not about protecting Muslim Kosovars or diffusing an ethnic powder keg in Europe’s backyard; it was about securing a pipeline from Turkey to Western Europe. Russia’s Chechnyan campaign is not designed to deter terrorism or forestall a Balkanization of its southern territory but instead to maintain access the immense gas reserved of the Caspian. America’s promotion of Project Colombia is not a misguided attempt at controlling its own domestic drug problem; no here too it’s about securing an oil pipeline from Venezuela. A 1993 piece in the Los Angeles Times argued that there could be significant amounts of oil and natural gas in Somalia, ripe for the taking if the US-led UN operation had restored peace. The war in Afghanistan? That was not about rooting a tyrannical regime that was indirectly responsible for the death of over 3,000 Americans three years ago. No, that was about establishing a natural gas pipeline. Never mind that any energy sector analyst will tell you of the tremendous costs and difficulties of establishing a pipeline across such mountainous terrain. Furthermore, let us imagine that there were no oil or gas in Afghanistan. Would it be so inconceivable that the U.S. would have had other reasons to invade?
I know that many will sneer that I am simply being naïve about geopolitics and international political economy. Yet I find it equally naïve to think that world peace would reign if we severed our dependence on oil (Although stopping to drive SUVs would be desirable since they cause more pollution and endanger the lives of those who drive of smaller cars). The reality is more complex. In our frustration with a dangerous world and a reckless Administration, it is tempting to hold onto straightforward economic explanations. While there is no doubt that natural resource exploitation is an important prism through which to analyze international affairs, it is not the only one nor is it necessarily the most important one. This simple minded and mono-causal outlook is not only intellectually problematic but also fundamentally dangerous. It is dangerous because it distracts us from problems that are direly need of fixing. As long as we dismiss the Iraq War as oil grab, we will not address the problems of the intelligence community, which inform our decision-makers, guides our foreign policy, and safeguards our diverse values and interests. Responsible and enlightened citizens have every reason to morally oppose the Iraq War, question its motives and conduct, and deplore its consequences. Yet focusing on the issue of oil is not the most intelligent way to do so.
For a more refined perspective on the role of natural resources in world conflict listen to this interview with Prof. Michael Klare on NPR’s Fresh Air (http://freshair.npr.org/day_fa.jhtml;jsessionid=2VXLQXMENPW0RLA5AINSFFI?display=day&todayDate=09/09/2004) or read his books Blood and Oil (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004) and Resource Wars (New York: Owl Books, 2002).

One Nation Under Canada

2004-09-09T01:15:00.000-04:00

Book Review

Michael Adams. Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada and the Myth of Converging Values. Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003.

Living abroad and living with Americans made me wonder why it is that Canadians are so obsessed with differentiating themselves from Americans. We, in Canada that is, seem to cling to the narcissism of small differences with our one and only neighbor. These purported differences range from the significant (secularism, gun control, health care, tolerance, internationalism) to the trivial (flavors of chips, beers, metric system, etc…). While many Canadians were thrilled by the successful Molson “I Am Canadian” beer ads, most spectators from outside the continent and south of the border could not hold back laughter and this pitiful attempt to mark ourselves off. This struggle for differentiation leads to some contradictions. The Globe and Mail put it succinctly: “We have become a people who, without a trace of irony, love to yell about how modest we are.” Despite all our loud kicking and screaming we are still more likely to be asked by an ignorant foreigner: “so what state are you from?”
In his latest book Fire and Ice, Michael Adams, the head of a Toronto based poling group Environics, attempts to prove the underlying differences between Americans and Canadians through quantitative poling analysis. More poignantly, Adams seeks to show that value differences between Canucks and Yankees have actually been widening over the course of the 1990s. Adams starts by drafting a value map that charts respect for authority, individualism, survival, and fulfillment. Based on these basic markers he constructs four quadrants representing status/security, authenticity/responsibility, exclusion/intensity, and idealism/autonomy. His basic conclusion is that over the 1990s Americans are drifting from the traditional authenticity/responsibility quadrant to the nihilistic and materialist exclusion/intensity quadrant while Canadians have been retrenching in the idealist/autonomy quadrant. Adams makes the interesting observation that while America came into being through individualist and idealist values contrary to Canada’s counterrevolutionary and conservative heritage, today these positions have reversed. By 2000, Canadians were to ones that had become more tolerant, idealist and willing to question authority. This helps explain the clashes between the U.S. and Canadian governments since the most influential segments of their populations come from antithetical poles of North American society (Progressive Quebec versus traditional U.S. South).
While Adams provides a refreshingly empirical view of what many Canadians feel on a daily basis, the book remains falls victim to the same nationalist obsession that plagues the debate in the first place. Adams is unabashedly a Canadian nationalist and makes it known throughout the book that Canada is not only different, but also superior (while recognizing that the U.S. is far more creative and entrepreneurial). In a most strongly worded passage regarding the U.S. Adams writes: “The pursuit of happiness often leads to strange and saccharine theme parks, mindless television and movie fare, addiction, gambling, substance abuse, and even often to the pathetic pursuit of salvation promised by huckster Christian evangelists- all diversions to compensate for a deep spiritual deficit.” While most of the Canadian readership may nod in agreement with his statements, they severely corrode the semblance of objectivity that such a pollster would seek to maintain. They also make this study relatively indigestible for any Americans that would be curious about their neighbors to the North. Furthermore, Adams should watch what he says since value shifts in the U.S. are often, although not always, forecasts for other lifestyle changes around the world. Adams also draws his conclusions from nothing more than a three surveys over an 8-year period. One wonders if such a time span is sufficient to accurately depict the sea change of values in North America. The biggest criticism however, is Adams’ treatment of America as a monolithic cohesive social group. The U.S. is incredibly diverse- and divided as we are seeing in this election year- which makes all this discussion of “Americanization” questionable. Which America are we becoming? We may be furthering ourselves from deep South Americans, but we certainly share a lot in common with the millions of Americans that live in the Northern Pacific Coast, New England, and cities such as New York, San Francisco, and Seattle (all of which display just as much tolerance as Canadians towards alternative lifestyle choices such as homosexuality). Moreover, it is common that the differences within the U.S. are greater than the differences between Canada and certain regions of the U.S. It is also important to keep in mind a third variable namely: whether or not Americans and Canadians are becoming closer with regards to the rest of the world. Adams never places Canadian and American values in the context of European or Asian values. We never know the answer to the essential question: Are the differences between Americans and Canadians trivial in comparison to the differences between North American values and those of the rest of the world.
Generally speaking Adams makes a well though out and empirical case for distinguishing Americans and Canadians. His study will give ammunition to those who wish to prove that Canada is a distinct society. Yet the way in which the book is written will almost guarantee that Adams will be preaching to the choir.

To take the test and see where you stand vis a vis American and Canadian values: http://fireandice.environics.net/surveys/fireandice/main/fireandice.asp?surveyID=1

Testing the World's Patience

2004-08-22T20:01:00.000-04:00

You would think with the current hysteria about nuclear proliferation, 8 out of 10 Americans supporting a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), 170 states signed onto the CTBT, 180 monitoring sites established, and the US military stating that a test ban should be in force that such a treaty would exist. Well, alas such optimism would be misguided. In 1999, the US senate refused by a margin of 48 to 51 (2/3rd majority is required for all US treaty ratification) to ratify the treaty signed by President Clinton. Despite the best efforts of the arms control community, the CTBT, the result of five painstaking years of negotiation, has been languishing on the sidelines of international affairs. This fact is as frustrating as it is dangerous.
The opponents of a comprehensive test ban treaty tend to argue the following points:
1) US nuclear weapons will not be as safe without regular testing
2) Confidence in the reliability of the nuclear stockpile will decline in the absence of nuclear testing
3) The CTBT is not completely verifiable. It is possible for states to cheat for military gain, without the possibility of detection
4) New nuclear designs cannot be developed without testing.
Note there is a difference between safety and reliability. Safety makes sure that the weapons do not detonate when they are not supposed to and reliability ensures that they do detonate when they are supposed to. While opponents do present legitimate concerns about the problems of the CTBT, these are ultimately not sufficient reasons not to ratify the treaty. Moreover, they display a profound ignorance of the political factors that drive nuclear proliferation. First, any freeze in the nuclear testing would secure America’s lead in nuclear weapons technology. The US not only had the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world but also, as a result of an advanced scientific and academic infrastructure, the most technically advanced ones. It would be hard, as opponents of the CTBT decry, for nuclear weapons states to develop new nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear tests. Thus the CTBT would help promote U.S. national security. Second, the issue of the reliability of the US nuclear stockpile is potentially irrelevant. If American nuclear laboratories are unsure of the reliability of their weapons, it is unlikely that America’s enemies will have any more of an idea. However, deterrence is not likely to be weakened as a consequence since no opponent will bank on the possibility that an American riposte will prove to be a dud. Besides, given the sheer size of the US armory, if one warhead fails there are sufficiently more to compensate. Nuclear weapons are, as Kenneth Waltz explains, existential deterrents. The threat they pose is so great, that even the hint of their use is often sufficient to deter enemies. Indeed this is traditionally how the US has compelled enemies to change their behavior in China in 1953 and the Suez in 1956. Because nuclear weapons are existential deterrents, the issue of whether they would actually work 100% of the time really misses the point. Unless the US plans to start using kiloton-range nuclear weapons on a regular basis, where issues of reliability could conceivably come into play strategically and economically, this issue is spurious. Americans can thus reap the profits of both nuclear deterrence and CTBT. Third, the CTBT would help America better detect nuclear tests because of the international network of seismic, hydro-acoustic, satellite, airborne radionuclide detection stations. Because the CTBTO is an international organization, it can gain better access for detection than the U.S. can gain on its own. Because of this extensive and growing network of stations, the CTBTO can reliably detect explosions greater than 1 kiloton and often explosions less than a 1 kt. Critics of the CTBT argue that states can cheat on their obligations by conducting explosions of less than 1 kt or by masking (decoupling in the arms control jargon) tests with other conventional explosives such as those used in mining. Detractors also argue that small explosions conducted in sealed underground cavities could elude international monitoring. A few rejoinders need to be made about these points. The issues of decoupling and cavity tests are not as straightforward as they seem. Usually mining explosions are conducted in a serial or “ripple” fashion, not in one single great explosion. Therefore their seismic pattern is noticeably different from that of a small-scale nuclear test. It is also generally easier to distinguish major mining areas from nuclear test sites. The issue of underground cavity tests, while theoretically possible does not detract from the utility of a CTBT. There is very little information than can be obtained from a small nuclear test conducted in sub-optimal test conditions needed to maintain secrecy. While this may not be as big an issue for seasoned nuclear powers such as Russia and China, these are major obstacles for new nuclear proliferators such as North Korea and Iran. Besides, new nuclear states will actually want to communicate their nuclear deterrent by proving their capability through testing. The construction of an underground cavity designed to avoid detection and the release of radioactive debris can be a large-scale operation that can blow the cover of a covert nuclear program. Note the construction of underground facilities in North Korea provided the US with major signals about the North’s nuclear program. In the 1980s, the drilling of a rudimentary testing shaft by South Africa pushed the US to arrest a potential nuclear test by the Apartheid regime. Thus even if the CTBT cannot detect all nuclear tests, it can reliably detect the vast majority of them, and lay additional tripwires to detect proliferators. We can expect that constantly improving detection technology will increase the reliability of the treaty in the future. The treaty will thus naturally become more robust over time without any need to negotiate new clauses. It would be naïve to see the CTBT as a panacea for nuclear testing and proliferation, but it would be equally foolish to reject its utility. Critics of the CTBT and other arms control treaties state that unless the agreements are perfectly verifiable, they will lull the international community into a dangerously false sense of security. Such comments are mind-boggling. It is difficult to believe that some detection capability would be more dangerous than no detection capability at all. It is also inconceivable that America, with its current obsession over terrorism and proliferation would be willing to put the issue on the backburner. Indeed, with the stakes so high, the international community will continue to view rogue states with the greatest suspicion. Indeed the very opposite will happen by rejecting the CTBT. Such contempt for international law hampers American arms control efforts. The treaty does not need to be perfectly flawless to be useful. The NPT clearly has its flaws, as shown by the debacle over Iraq’s and North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs in the 1990, but remains a cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime. Perhaps the reason for the US’s knee jerk reaction against the CTBT lies in its own desire to design and test new nuclear weapons. While it is true that impressive advances in computer modeling technology do not obviate the necessity of weapon testing, developing new nuclear weapons does substantial and unnecessary damage to the nonproliferation regime. In the words of an Indian academic, the US cannot continue to preach nuclear abstinence while itself engage in nuclear promiscuity. The nuclear apartheid enshrined in the NPT promotes nuclear proliferation by attributing prestige and perceived power to the to these kinds of weapons. This is why Article VI of the NPT requires the nuclear powers to engage in eventual nuclear disarmament. By seeking new ways to use nuclear weapons, the US would breach the spirit of the NPT, erode the nuclear taboo, and push states to acquire these weapons to avoid being the target of them. This nuclear hypocrisy is best epitomized by the American strategy of using nuclear bunker busters to destroy foreign stockpiles of WMD. Numerous studies have shown that these weapons would have limited utility since it will always be easier to build deeper bunkers than more performing earth penetrators and because the radioactive debris will limit their uses in inhabited areas where future WMDs could be placed. More to the point, the miniaturization of nuclear weapons eventually makes the use of fission devices useless. Large conventional weapons such as massive ordinance aerial bombs (MOABs) and so-called “daisy cutters” can deliver the same payload as small nuclear weapons without the breaking the nuclear taboo or creating radioactive fallout. The argument about developing new nuclear weapons betrays a parallel agenda in the debate. The problem lies in the fact that the same people in the national laboratories (such as Los Alamos, Sandia, and Livermore) who inform our decisions about the CTBT are those whose livelihood depends on continued nuclear testing. This could explain the flip-flopping of the Los Alamos’s endorsement then rejection of the CTBT. What these positions also do is put the technical before the political. Since proliferation and arms races are above all political phenomena (the weapons do not build themselves) political considerations should take precedence over the technical considerations about the desirability of constructing new weapons and testing the reliability of old ones. The technical benefits of resuming testing are far outweighed by the political fallout and at the end of the day, all that counts is political. If the US is serious about nonproliferation, it will need to reign in its own program, design new ways to ensure the safety of its nuclear stockpile and sign the CTBT. Its time to get serious about proliferation, and we are only doing ourselves harm by stalling on the CTBT.
For more info:
The CTBTO: http://www.ctbto.org
Nuclear Threat Initiative: http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_9c.html
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (pro-CTBT): http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ctbt.htm
The National Insitute for Public Policy (anti-CTBT): http://www.nipp.org/3.php

6 Levels of War

2004-08-16T16:50:00.000-04:00

It is with much amazement and horror that one notes the precipitous fall of American standing in the world over the last four years. The recent scandal over the torture of Iraqi prisoners of war seems to be yet another blow to the credibility of the U.S. Of the three reasons for going to war in Iraq, the U.S. has exhausted its last. The first reason for entering in war in Iraq, weapons of mass destruction, has proven to be a monumental intelligence failure. Besides being a significant abuse of the trust of the American and world community, this deceit is likely to plague the U.S. in the future. Imagine a time when there will be a real and imminent threat from terrorists or other political actors. Future Presidents will tell America that they have credible proof of an attack that requires the permission immediate action. In such a situation, jaded citizens and members of Congress will (understandably) be less likely to take appropriate action. No longer will we be likely to throw blood and money at what may be political ploys to gain domestic support for a “wartime president.” Dishonesty has real consequences on the security of Americans. The second reason for going to war in Iraq, namely Iraq’s violation of UN resolutions, has rung hollow faced with the constant resistance of the UN and the international community. It is clear that the U.S. cannot unilaterally interpret the meaning of international law, particularly when it seems so evidently self-serving. The third and final reason for invading Iraq was to overthrow a cruel dictator and to establish a liberal democracy where Iraqi could enjoy the rights and liberties enjoyed by the more fortunate countries in the West. This rationale for war in Iraq has started to crumble, and long before the incidents of torture. From the beginning it was a weak rationale for going to war. Americans may be attached to liberal democratic values at home but when it comes to making financial and human sacrifices to spread these values abroad, they are notoriously squeamish and fickle. Any war that relies too heavily on the humanitarian impulses of America is on very weak ground indeed. America, like well off post-modern societies in West is one of now one of risk mitigation. Unlike in past centuries where life was, to paraphrase Hobbes, nasty brutish and short, citizen today can expect to live well into their seventies and will do virtually everything in their power to do so, from Atkins diets to gym memberships. We in West have fewer children than ever. Therefore, the opportunity cost of warfare has increased dramatically. Americans are no longer willing to see their offspring fall anonymously in battle in far-flung place for complicated and un-heroic objectives in the name of ungrateful natives. The cult of the body and of the individual in American society is reflected in its foreign policy, making war difficult to sustain not economically but socially. Beyond the particularities of Western society, the credibility of the U.S. was further eroded by the nature of the reconstruction effort. Although financial profit was never the driving motivation for war, the highly politicized race for reconstruction contracts in Iraq gave the impression of neo-colonial plunder rather than humanitarian aid. This became all the more frustrating given the slow pace of reconstruction. With the pictures of torture, America’s very commitment to the values that it claimed to be establishing began to be questioned. Despite America’s best intentions, the coupling of all these factors undermined the patience of Iraqis and the credibility of the U.S. In the end, what matters in politics is as much what is as what others perceive it to be. And what others are beginning (or continuing) to see is that the U.S. has no legitimate reason to be in Iraq. Yet, the tragic paradox is that at the time when we want most to leave, we cannot afford to so.
President Bush seems to believe that while the U.S. may be in engaged in War on Terror, we are not engaged in war in Iraq. He is obviously wrong, notably because the U.S. is not engaged in a war in Iraq but instead in wars at six different levels.
*U.S. vs. Ba’athist Regime. At a first level, the war in Iraq was a war against the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein. The Bush Administration, as well, I suspect as most Americans, believed that this was the only mission.
*War against occupation. Yet, the war has taken on second level as one carried out by Iraqis against occupation.
*Civil War. In the political vacuum that followed the invasion the war took on a third level, as a civil war between domestic factions vying for power and influence over the future shape of the country.
*U.S. electoral politics. At a fourth level, it is an extension American electoral politics. At a time when the U.S. plays such an important global position, U.S. politics are world politics.
*Internationalism vs. Neoconservatism. At a fifth level, it is debate between American unilateralists and neo-conservatives against international multilateralists and institutionalists.
*Islam vs. West. And finally, at a sixth level, Iraq has become the battleground between radical Islam and the West.
These six levels make the resolution of conflict in Iraq exceedingly difficult. Each level involves different actors and actions taken at one level may have adverse effects at another. Unfortunately such a pattern is likely to lead to sub-optimal outcomes for all the actors involved and most tragically for ordinary Iraqi civilians. These levels also operate in different time cycles. The war on the Ba’athist regime, for example is now over. The U.S. may have been a victim of its own success. Victory came so quickly that the U.S. was unprepared to assume the responsibilities of governing a restive country. Furthermore, the U.S. quickly disbanded the Iraqi army, which it should be noted never even wanted to fight or resist the Americans. This flooded the Iraqi labor market with young (armed) men. As for the second level of the war, the war against American occupation, it is only at its midpoint. The admission of torture on Iraqi prisoners is likely to aggravate resistance. Despite the Administration’s handover to the Iraqi Governing council, it remains still be heavily reliant on American troops for policing and security functions. This means that attacks on American troops will continue. If last year’s bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad can serve as any warning, we should expect attacks on the UN as well. This is because Iraq is still deeply in the middle of third level of war, namely civil war.
It is delusional to believe that there is widespread agreement on a UN mandate in Iraq. Iraq is a factitious country, with political actors that profit from the chaos and have no incentive to see a just and peaceful settlement of violence. These are what are called “spoilers.” Here are a few examples. Maqtada al-Sadr, the firebrand leader of radical Iraqi Shias is not interested in the political reforms proposed by the Americans because they afford too many rights to the Kurdish and Sunni minorities as he sees at the expense of the majority Shias. He would rather cause insurrection and chaos than see the establishment of a political system that does not hand power to the majority. Of course the Americans are right to be weary of giving too much power to the Shia majority. The last time a majority ethnic group regained power from the dictatorship of a minority ethnic group we ended up with the Rwandan genocide. A second example of spoiler groups are foreign Mujihadeen (or terrorists), which connects to the fifth dimension of the war in Iraq. Foreign Mujihadeen and terrorists are eager to turn the civil war in Iraq into a clash of civilizations between the Muslim world and the West. They want to paint the war in Iraq as a battle in a campaign against Islam by invoking Americans as crusaders, by attacking coalition troops from mosques to encourage retaliation, and by invoking God instead of the will of the Iraqi people. They avoid bringing up the will of Iraqis with good reason. First Iraqi civilians have suffered the most from their bombings. Second, by sacrificing political stabilization, domestic peace, and economic reconstruction, their actions cause and instrumentalize Iraqi suffering. Unfortunately, these spoilers are likely to be endemic in Iraq regardless if the U.S., the UN, or a moderate Iraqi government rules the country. This dimension of the conflict that is likely to be protracted, driven by larger ideological forces in a wider historical context, and not limited to the Iraqi theater. By trying to defuse the anger caused the torture of prisoners, President Bush played into the hand of radical Islam. On television he apologized to the Arab world, although this was in no way an issue of the Arab world. This is an issue of Iraqi human rights. He thus reinforced the image that this was a conflict between the U.S. and the greater Muslim Middle East, which it is not. The next day there were protests in Turkey against the torture of Muslims and after that, radical Islamicists filmed an American being beheaded in retaliation for the humiliation caused against Muslims.
While the U.S. is getting bogged down in the Iraqi civil war, it is at the end of the debate with internationalists. Neo-conservatism, after reaching its hubristic apex during President Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” speech is now defunct. The U.S. recognizes that it is in its best interest to work through the expertise and legitimacy of the UN. At a fundamental level. Neoconservatives misjudged the nature of American power. America may be a preeminent military power but it is not omnipotent, and certainly not in the political and economic spheres. Neocons failed to recognized that force is not power and power is not influence. All these concepts are held together by legitimacy, something this administration direly lacks. Furthermore, the Bush Administration misperceived international institutions and international law as restricting American power like so many Lilliputian strings tying down Gulliver. In fact, the whole liberal international structure continues to function as a power multiplier for the U.S. projecting it’s home grown values abroad. However, Europeans and Canada should not rejoice in the America’s troubles. It is not in Europe or Canada’s best interest to watch civil war break out in Iraq and an incipient Iraqi democracy wallow at the hands of radicals. Most importantly, it is not in Europe or Canada’s best interest to see Iraq become a breeding ground for terrorism against the West. Europe will not escape this scourge. To paraphrase Trotsky “You may not be interested in war, but war is certainly interested in you.” A recent Al Qaeda statement proclaimed that it would be targeting American as well as UN officials in Iraq. This is not an enemy that can be appeased.

Shooting yourself in the foot

2004-08-14T19:11:00.000-04:00

Although I feel that Bush is certainly playing the proliferation/terrorism card too strongly and too politically, there are times when I feel he is doing everything in his power to actually make things worse. For example, Bush happened to invade the only member of the axis of evil that did not happen to possess or be developing nuclear weapons. Since Bush came to power, North Korea has been found to be developing nuclear weapons and is suspected to possess between 3 and 8 of them. Bush refused to deal with North Korea at a crucial window of opportunity since he was busy assembling a coalition to fight a toothless dictator in Iraq. With regards to Iran, the situation has degraded drastically since I was in Vienna. We are rapidly approaching a point of no return there, and the only thing scarier than that is talk of having the Israelis do the dirty work of a preventative sabotage for us. Once again, because the Bush administration lacks any diplomatic credibility or leadership, they resort to their one-dimensional policy of brute force. Indeed, when all you have is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail. Contrast this with the case of Libya, a once rogue state that recently disarmed it nuclear and chemical program. While the republicans want to spin this in such ways to show that it was the Iraq War that scared Qadhafi into disarming, the truth is that it was four years of patient diplomacy and cool-headed bargaining initiated by the UK and the Clinton Administration, that brought a drastic turnaround. Yet, I find it amazing that the Bush camp is the one that says that Kerry will not be able to provide security to Americans. It was the Bush Administration that derailed talks of a biological weapons convention that would allow constant monitoring and inspection of potential weapons facilities worldwide and it was the Bush Administration that recently dismissed a widely applauded treaty that would put an international ban the production of fissile material to be used in nuclear weapons. How long are we supposed to continue to believe this charade? How long are we supposed to believe that the nation is safer while we continue to be traumatized by nebulous threat alerts?